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I. INTRODUCTION
Montana water law is characterized by the prior appropriation
doctrine. The doctrine arose from the need to provide an orderly system of
distributing water for the settlement and development of the arid land.'
Historically, the doctrine did not address "public rights" in water because
of the emphasis placed on private development of natural resources. Yet
recognition of public rights in water has increased as values associated with
the aesthetic, environmental and recreational uses of water gain more
1. The prior appropriation doctrine originally grew out of custom, primarily in the western
mining camps. Later the doctrine became entrenched in federal expansionist policy. For example, the
Desert Land Act of 1877, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1982)),
allowed an appropriator to use water upon the appropriator's desert land entry. The Desert Land Act
also declared all surplus nonnavigable waters on public lands available for appropriation. See I
WATERS AND WATER RiGHTs 74-83, 95 (R. Clark ed. 1967). For a discussion of the importance of the
Desert Land Act of 1877 and the prior appropriation doctrine to the development of the West, see C. P.
WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 412-18, 439-52 (1931).
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emphasis in our culture.2 Consequently, the public's interest in the
allocation of water increases as the competition for Montana's water
resources increases. An important question then is whether the prior
appropriation doctrine can accommodate these changing public needs and
interests in water use and allocation.
In three recent Montana Supreme Court decisions, Montana Coali-
tion for Stream Access v. Curran,' Montana Coalition for Stream Access
v. Hildreth4 and Gait v. State,5 the court used the public trust doctrine to
protect the public's right to use Montana streams for recreational
purposes. With Curran, Hildreth and Gait, Montana joined a growing
number of western states that use the public trust doctrine to analyze and
determine water resource conflicts.
At issue in Curran and Hildreth was the extent to which the public
could recreationally use Montana streams. The controversy centered on
whether the adjacent landowner could exclusively control the recreational
use of certain streams running through private property. The Montana
Supreme Court found the public had a right to use recreationally any
stream capable of recreational use.6
The Montana decisions did not directly address a conflict between the
public interest in using water recreationally and the prior appropriation
doctrine, but such a conflict is likely to occur. A foreseeable claim by
recreationists is that a landowner's legal use of a legally acquired water
right for irrigation7 deprives the stream of so much water that the
recreational use of the stream is hindered or eliminated. The question
arises whether the legally appropriated water right is absolute against the
public's right of recreation. This conflict could also be labelled a confronta-
tion between public and private interests or between the public trust and
prior appropriation doctrines.
This comment explores the outcome of a confrontation between the
prior appropriation doctrine and public rights in water. The prior appropri-
ation doctrine is reviewed first, and a possible resolution of a dispute
between recreational and appropriative uses is provided through the
application of that doctrine. The comment then develops the history of the
public trust doctrine, surveys the Montana cases addressing the public
2. Thorson, Brown & Desmond, Forging Public Rights in Montana's Waters, 6 PUB. LAND L.
REV. I, 3 (1985) [hereinafter Forging].
3. -Mont.-., 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
4. -. Mont.- 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
5. - Mont.-., 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
6. Curran,.Mont. at - 682 P.2d at 171; Hildreth, -Mont. at__, 684 P.2d at 1091.
See also infra text accompanying notes 72-115.
7. Irrigation consumes nearly 90 percent of all water in the West. Wilkinson, Western Water
Law in Transition, 56 U. CoLO. L. REV. 317, 321 (1985).
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trust doctrine, and examines how other states have applied the doctrine.
Finally, the comment analyzes the outcome of a collision in Montana
between the prior appropriation and public trust doctrines.
II. PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
The prior appropriation doctrine grew in the arid West from a
practical need to transport scarce water supplies for use in mining,
irrigation and municipal activities. The doctrine established an orderly
distribution of water so that it could be most beneficially used.8 To acquire
a water right, an appropriator must divert a specific quantity of water for a
beneficial and reasonable purpose. As among appropriators, the principle
of "first in time, first in right" controls the distribution of water by
prioritizing water rights according to the time of their original acquisition.
Thus, an appropriator from a given watercourse gains the exclusive right to
use the water necessary to fulfill that appropriation over any subsequent
appropriators. This priority holds even in periods of short water supply
when an appropriator's right consumes all of the water in a watercourse to
the exclusion of subsequent appropriators. An appropriative right is good
only to the extent of the amount of water originally intended to be
beneficially used and only so long as that use is properly exercised.9
Before 1973 a water right was acquired in Montana one of two ways:
by use or by filing. An appropriator acquired a water right by use by simply
diverting' 0 water and putting it to a beneficial use." Under an 1885
statute12 a water right could also be acquired by filing a notice of
appropriation with the county clerk, posting a notice at the diversion site,
and proceeding to complete the diversion with reasonable diligence."3 In
1973, the Montana legislature passed the 1973 Water Use Act. 4 This Act
mandates that the exclusive method of appropriating water is to obtain a
permit from the Montana Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation. 5
8. See I W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 157-80
(1971).
9. See id.; T. DONEY, MONTANA WATER LAW HANDBOOK 5-8 (1981); A. STONE, MONTANA
WATER LAW FOR THE 1980's 20 (1981).
10. In Montana, a diversion may not be an essential element for an appropriative water right.
See DONEY, supra note 9, at 28-30.
11. Id. at 40-44; STONE, supra note 9, at 47.
12. REv. CODE MONT. §§ 89-810 to -812 (1947), repealed by 1973 Water Use Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -807 (1987).
13. DONEY, supra note 9. at44-53; STONE, supra note 9, at 47-52. The Montana Supreme Court
held in Murray v. Tingley, 20 Mont. 260, 50 P. 723 (1897) that, despite the statutory language, filing
was not the exclusive way of acquiring a water right. Id. at 268-69, 50 P. at 725.
14. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -807 (1987).
15. Id. §§ 85-2-301 and -302.
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Once acquired, two key elements, beneficial use and priority, charac-
terize an appropriative water right in Montana. Under Montana law, the
concept of beneficial use demands that a water right must be put to a legal,
beneficial purpose. The concept of beneficial use also limits the amount of
water which can be reasonably used for that legal purpose at the time the
water right is acquired."0 As previously discussed, a water right receives a
priority date when acquired by an appropriator which makes that right
superior against all subsequent appropriators. The priority date gives a
water right its chief value in times of scarce water resources. 17 Therefore,
an appropriator's water right in Montana consists of a right to use a specific
amount of water for a legal, beneficial purpose with a priority over
subsequent appropriators for that specific amount. An appropriator does
not own the water itself; an appropriator owns a legally protected property
right to use the water.'"
The appropriation doctrine is the foundation of Montana water law.' 9
Even before Montana became a state in 1889, the Montana Supreme
Court fully recognized the appropriation doctrine with the support of the
United States Supreme Court.2° Montana's 1889 Constitution expressly
adopted the system by stating that "[t]he use of all water now appropri-
ated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, distribution, or
other beneficial use. . . shall be held to be a public use.. ."21 The 1972
Montana Constitution provides that "[a] 11 existing rights to the use of any
waters for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and
confirmed. '22 The Montana Supreme Court construed the 1972 language
16. McDonald v. State, -Mont.-, 722 P.2d 598 (1986), is the most recent case
reaffirming the concept of beneficial use as the basis, measure, and limit of all appropriative water
rights in Montana. Id. at 601-02. Historically, practically any use was beneficial. DONEY, supra note 9,
at 24-25. Currently, the definition of beneficial use seems almost limitless: "Beneficial use. . . means a
use of water for the benefit of the appropriator, other persons, or the public, including but not limited to
agricultural . . . domestic, fish and wildlife, industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and
recreational uses;. . ." MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(a). See also DONEY, supra note 9, at 25-28
for a detailed discussion of the problem of quantifying the amount of water used for a beneficial
purpose.
17. DONEY, supra note 9, at 69.
18. Id. at 7. Montana's waters are publici juris under the 1972 Constitution and pre-1972 case
law. See. e.g., Allen v. Petrick, 69 Mont. 373, 222 P. 451 (1924); Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v.
Miller, 93 Mont. 248, 17 P.2d 1074 (1933).
19. DONEY, supra note 9, at 5. For a detailed discussion of the appropriation doctrinie see
generally id. at 5-84 and STONE, supra note 9, at 18-96.
20. In Atchison v. Peterson, I Mont. 561 (1872), aff'd, 87 U.S. 507 (1874), the Montana
Supreme Court stated: "The doctrine that the first appropriator of water.. . is entitled to the waters of
a stream as against subsequent appropriators without material interruption in the flow thereof, or in
quantity or quality, is fully recognized . Id. at 569. See also Gallagher v. Basey, 1 Mont. 457
(1872), aff'd, 87 U.S. 670 (1875).
21. MONT. CONST. art. Il1, § 15 (1889).
22. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(1) (1972).
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as reaffirming the public policy of the 1889 Constitution and confirming all
water rights acquired under the 1889 Constitution.23 The prior appropria-
tion doctrine also served as the foundation for the 1973 Water Use Act24
even though that Act introduced radical procedural changes in Montana
water law.25
By adhering to the appropriation doctrine, Montana law embraces
stable priority for historic uses, concern for private rights over public
rights, and preference for consumptive uses.26 Given this background, the
question arises whether the prior appropriation doctrine itself could be
used to resolve conflicts arising from competing public and private uses
such as recreation and irrigation.
A. A Prior Appropriation Doctrine Solution
The 1889 Montana Constitution allowed appropriation of water for
beneficial uses. However, recreational use as a beneficial use was not
expressly recognized until 1973 in the Water Use Act. 8 Also, Montana
case law and the appropriation statutes adopted under the 1889 Constitu-
tion apparently required an actual diversion from the stream to perfect an
appropriated water right for a beneficial use.29 However, a diversion may
not be a requirement 30 as the following case suggests.
In Paradise Rainbows v. Fish and Game Commission,1 a Montana
Supreme Court decision, the Fish and Game Commission ignored the
possible diversion requirement and claimed that the public had acquired a
water right by beneficially using a stream for fishing. 2 Given the facts of
the case, the court rejected the Commission's argument, but stated that
[u]nder the proper circumstances we feel that such a public
interest should be recognized. This issue will inevitably grow
more pressing as increasing demands are made on our water
resources. An abundance of good trout streams is unquestionably
23. General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 515, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975).
24. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -807. See id. § 85-2-301(1) ("A person may only
appropriate water for a beneficial use."); id. § 85-2-401 (l) ("As between appropriators, the first in time
is the first in right").
25. DONEY, supra note 9, at 5, 10-11.
26. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 321.
27. MONT. CONST. art. 1II, § 15 (1889).
28. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(a); see also supra note 16.
29. STONE, supra note 9, at 51-53; DONEY, supra note 9, at 28-30.
30. STONE, supra note 9, at 51-53; DONEY, supra note 9, at 29-30.
31. 148 Mont. 412, 421 P.2d 717 (1966).
32. Id. at 419, 421 P.2d at 721. The appropriator challenging the Commission's argument was
using his water right to fill a series of private fish ponds. Id. at 418-19, 421 P.2d at 720-21. The validity
of the appropriator's water right was not at issue. The Commission had granted the appropriator
several licenses over a period of years to operate the ponds. Id. at 414-15,721 P.2d at 718-19. The court
also impliedly assumed the private fish ponds were of a beneficial use. Id. at 420, 421 P.2d at 721.
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an asset of considerable value to the people of Montana. 3
The court in Paradise Rainbows implied that an actual diversion of
water was not required to perfect a water right and suggested that the
absence of fishing or recreation as a beneficial use before 1973 did not
specifically preclude that use as a legal, beneficial use. The court further
suggested that given the proper circumstances, a public fishing right should
be allowed.34 Therefore, an in-stream water right could be claimed by
proving the date the right was acquired and how much stream water was
beneficially used for fishing or recreation. However, the claimant would
also have to show that, before 1973, fishing or recreation was a beneficial
use even though neither use had ever been declared beneficial.3 5
Arguably, under Paradise Rainbows, recreational fishing was a
permitted beneficial use by private appropriators before 1973. It could thus
be an allowable beneficial use upon which to base a public water right in
certain situations. A court could simply declare which appropriated right
had priority in a confrontation between a public fishing or recreational
right and an irrigation right. This solution has limits however. The date the
public right was acquired by use and how much water was necessary for
that recreational use would be difficult to prove. If an appropriative public
right was acquired, the amount of water would be limited to that used at the
date the water right was acquired. The public's expanding and changing
needs could not be considered except as newly appropriated rights with
later priority dates. Further, since the 1973 Water Use Act established a
permit system as the only way to acquire a water right,38 this analysis could
only apply to recreational use rights claimed and acquired before 1973.
The Water Use Act also put in doubt whether a private person can acquire
33. Id. at 419-20, 421 P.2d at 721. The Commission was trying to prevent the diversion of an
entire creek under a valid appropriation by requiring the appropriator to release some water by
installing a fish ladder in his dam. The Commission argued the ladder was necessary to maintain the
prior water right the public had acquired in the stream for fishing. The court rejected the claim because
the Commission had known about the appropriation for more than seven years and had not previously
requested a fish ladder. Id.
34. Id. at 419-20, 421 P.2d at 721.
35. However, recreation has never been declared not to be a beneficial use. DONEY, supra note 9,
at 24.
36. Currently, Montana is undergoing a state-wide court adjudication of all existing Montana
water rights as required by the 1979 amendments to the 1973 Water Use Act pursuant to the
adjudicative mandate found in MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3(4) (1972). Consequently, after the current
adjudication process in Montana is completed, this analysis applying the prior appropriation doctrine
will be unusable. Under this state-wide adjudication, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-223 allows only the
Department of Fish, Wildlife, and Parks to represent the public in claiming public appropriative rights
for recreational use. Therefore, only the department is a valid claimant under the Paradise Rainbows
analysis. Incidentally, MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-223 specifically disclaims any determination of
whether recreation was a beneficial use before 1973.
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an in-stream water right for recreation, 7 even though recreation is a
beneficial use under the Water Use Act. 8 One way courts have overcome
these types of limits is to ground public rights in the public trust doctrine.
III. PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
The public trust doctrine evolved to protect the public's interest in
certain unique, valuable and irreplaceable natural resources.39 Histori-
cally, the doctrine's purpose was to preserve public ownership of navigable
waters and the underlying beds to protect public rights of navigation,
commerce and fishery.4 Courts in various states have expanded both the
public rights and the waters protected by the doctrine.41
In Martin v. Waddell,42 the United States Supreme Court held that
after the American Revolution the peoples of each of the original thirteen
states became sovereign.43 Thus, the people through their respective states
held the absolute right to all the states' navigable waters and soils
underneath the navigable waters for their own common use. 4" Three years
later, the Court in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan" deemed that states
admitted after the original thirteen also took title to lands underlying
navigable waters. 4" The Court reasoned that the federal government held
such lands in trust for new states to ensure their admittance on an equal
footing with the original states.47 Although the issue in each of these cases
actually concerned land underlying navigable waters, the Court subse-
37. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) permits publicagencies to makein-stream reservations of
water for "existing or future beneficial uses or to maintain a minimum flow, level, or quality of water
.... "Therefore, apparently only public agencies may acquire an in-stream water right or reservation
for recreational purposes, especially given MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-223. See supra note 36. But cf.
STONE, supra note 9, at 51-53 and DONEY, supra note 9, at 28-29 (suggesting that a private person may
acquire an in-stream water right).
38. Although MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(2)(a) includes recreation as a beneficial use,
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-102(1) defines "appropriate" to mean "divert, impound, or withdraw
(including by stock for stock water) a quantity of water or, in the case of a public agency, to reserve
water in accordance with 85-2-316."
39. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C.D.L. REv.
233, 240 (1980). For general background on the public trust doctrine see the various papers on The
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law and Management: A Symposium, in 14 U.C.D.L.
REV. 181-316 (1980).
40. Johnson, supra note 39, at 240.
41. Id. at 240-41.
42. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
43. Id. at 410.
44. Id.
45. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
46. Id. at 230.
47. Id. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1894) (holding that the federal
government held territorial navigable waters and the underlying beds in trust for the states admitted
from the western territories).
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quently applied the concept to include the navigable waters themselves.4 8
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois9 constitutes the premier
expression of the public trust doctrine by the United States Supreme
Court. In that case the Illinois legislature granted nearly all of Chicago's
Lake Michigan waterfront to the railroad.50 The legislature rescinded the
grant several years later and the Court upheld the rescission on the basis of
the public trust doctrine.51
The Court reasoned that under Pollard the state of Illinois held title to
the lands underlying the navigable waters of Lake Michigan. This title
empowered the state of Illinois to control the waters above.52 The Court
stated the title was "held in trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties. ' 53 The trust imposed upon the state over property in which
the public had an interest "[could not] be relinquished by a transfer of the
property." 54 The Court concluded a state can not abdicate the trust by
placing the navigable waters and underlying beds entirely in the hands of
private parties as this would be inconsistent with preserving the public
uses.5 5 The state may give up control of trust property only where the grant
by the state to a private party either improved or did not impair the trust
purposes.5 6 The Illinois Central decision thus states unequivocally that a
state has a public trust duty to preserve and protect navigable waters and
the underlying beds so as to ensure the public's continued enjoyment of
navigation, commerce and fishery over these navigable waters.5
The definition of "navigable waters" determines the lands and waters
over which a state has public trust responsibilities. The basic test defining
navigability under federal law was laid down first in The Daniel Ball.8 The
United States Supreme Court stated that waters which are navigable in
fact are navigable in law.59 "And they are navigable in fact when they are
used, or are susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, as
48. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 207 & n.25 (citing among 17 United States
Supreme Court cases: Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324 (1876); Illinois Cent. RR Co. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892); and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
49. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
50. Id. at 438-43, 448-49.
51. Id. at 448-49.
52. Id. at 435-36, 452.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 453.
55. Id. at 452-53.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 452.
58. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
59. Id. at 563.
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highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. ' 60 This
test for navigability determines the lands and waters to which a state takes
title upon the "equal footing" rationale of Pollard.61 The title to the
navigable waters and the underlying beds taken by the state are subject to
the public trust principles expressed in Illinois Central.
While the Daniel Ball test for navigability determines which waters
are public for purposes imposed by federal law under Pollard and Illinois
Central, states are free to adopt their own test of navigability or other
standard to define what rights the public may have under state law and in
which waters those rights may be exercised.62 State courts must contend
with two separate, yet related, sets of trust principles when utilizing the
public trust doctrine to evaluate resource allocation and use decisions. One
set of principles, laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois
Central, involves those lands and waters which are navigable under the
Daniel Ball test. The other set of trust principles is determined by the law of
the individual state.
States have used their distinct power to expand the public uses and
extend the types of waters protected under the public trust doctrine. On
waters deemed navigable under the federal test, some state courts have
expanded the protected public uses beyond navigation, commerce and
fishery to purposes such as recreation and ecology.6 California extended
public trust protection to include nonnavigable tributaries of waters that
are deemed navigable under the federal test.64 Other states have expanded
the uses and extended the waters covered under the doctrine by asking
simply whether the waters are suitable for public use regardless of their
navigability under the federal test.65
State courts have used the public trust doctrine to evaluate transfers
60. Id.
61. This test also determines over which waters Congress' commerce power extends. WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 205-06.
62. Id. at 212-17.SeealsoSToNE, supra note 9, at 89-95. "[W)hat shall bedeemeda navigable
water within the meaning of the local rules of property is for the determination of the several States."
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 262 (1913), reh'g denied, 228 U.S. 708 (1913).
63. Lamprey v. State, 52 Minn. 181, 53 N.W. 1139 (1893) (recreation); Marks v. Whitney, 6
Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (ecology, scientific study and aesthetics).
64. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419,658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 144-
61.
65. WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note l,at 214-17. See Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137
(Wyo. 1961) (floating and recreational use irrespective of navigability concept); Muench v. Public
Service Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492,53 N.W. 2d 514(1952) (adopting a navigability test determined by the
water's susceptibility to recreational floating); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,
-. Mont-, 682 P.2d 163 (1984) (capability of waters for recreational use determines whether
they can be so used).
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of public trust property and changes in the public uses of trust property
both under principles expressed in Illinois Central and under the states'
individual expressions of the trust principles. 6 In a relatively recent
development, discussed later in this comment, three state courts indicated
that the public trust doctrine acts as a limit on water allocation decisions
made under the appropriation doctrine. 7 In light of these decisions, the
question arises whether Montana should use the public trust doctrine to
evaluate and possibly limit water appropriations. A review of the current
status of the public trust doctrine in Montana is helpful in answering this
question.
A. The Montana Cases
Although the Montana Supreme Court did not refer expressly to the
public trust doctrine until 1984 in Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Curran,68 an earlier Montana case recognized the rudiments of public
rights which the doctrine purports to protect. In Gibson v. Kelly,6 9 an 1895
title dispute case, the Montana Supreme Court stated that "while the
abutting owner owns to the low-water mark on navigable rivers, still the
public have certain rights of navigation and fishery upon the river ...
The court did not consider the scope of these public rights, but the court did
follow the strict federal test of navigability.7 1 Presumably, the public rights
to which the court referred were those rights protected by the public trust
doctrine enunciated in Illinois Central and applicable to Montana as a
matter of federal law.
The Montana Supreme Court has explicitly addressed the public trust
doctrine in three recent cases.7 2 Those cases are Montana Coalition for
Stream Access v. Curran,73 Montana Coalition for Stream Access v.
Hildreth74 and Galt v. State. 5 The discussion of the public trust doctrine in
these cases revolved around the following provision from article IX, section
3(3) of the 1972 Montana Constitution:
66. See Johnson, supra note 39, at 242-44; Desmond, The Public Trust Doctrine: Scope of
Legislative Power, in WATER RIGHTS ADJUDICATION/STREAM ACCESS FOR RECREATIONAL USE (THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE) ch. VIII (1984) (provides a catalog of specific cases). State courts have
generally been lax in expressing the distinct differences in the two sets of trust principles.
67. See infra text accompanying notes 134-65.
68. -Mont.-., 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
69. 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895).
70. Id. at 423, 39 P. at 519.
71. Id. at 421-23, 39 P. at 519.
72. There was an attempt to get public trust language explicitly in the 1972 Constitution. See
Forging, supra note 2, at 20-21.
73. -Mont-, 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
74. .Mont-., 684 P.2d 1088 (1984).
75. -Mont.-_, 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
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All surface, underground, flood, and atmospheric waters within
the boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as
provided by law. 8
The Montana court in both Curran and Hildreth used this provision and
considerations of the public trust doctrine to find broad public recreational
rights in Montana waters.7 In response to these cases, the legislature
passed the "Stream Access" bil 7a in an attempt to codify the Curran and
Hildreth decisions. Recently, in Gait the court struck down as unconstitu-
tional certain provisions of the stream access statute and further defined
the public trust doctrine in Montana.
In Curran, the first public trust doctrine case in Montana, a conflict
arose between recreationists and adjacent landowners over the use of the
Dearborn River.79 Though recreationists used the river for fishing and
floating, Curran, the abutting landowner, claimed the right to restrict the
use of the river on those portions which flowed though his land based on his
claimed ownership of those portions of the river's banks and beds.80 The
recreationists asserted a constitutional right to use the river free from
interference or harassment from Curran.81
The Montana Supreme Court first upheld the district court's finding
that the Dearborn River was navigable in fact under the federal test. 2 The
court then traced the history of federal cases which held that the United
States government held navigable waters in trust for future states in order
to admit those states on an equal footing with the original thirteen states.83
Upon statehood, title to navigable waters and the underlying beds passed to
the states to be "held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have [the]
liberty of fishing therein . '84" The court noted these considerations
applied to waters determined navigable under the federal test for title.85
76. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3(3) (1972). See Forging, supra note 2, at 19-25 fora history of this
constitutional provision.
77. Forging, supra note 2, at 29-33.
78. Codified at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1987).
79. Curran, -Mont. at - , 682 P.2d at 165.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at _ 682 P.2d at 166-68. The Montana Supreme Court upheld the district court's
application of the log floating test to determine the navigability of the Dearborn River under federal
law. In Curran, two competent historians testified that before and around the time of Montana's
admission to the Union, the Dearborn River had been used for commercial log drives. Id. The log
floating test for navigability was authorized by the United States Supreme Court in The Montello, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874).
83. Curran, -Mont. at-., 682 P.2d at 166-68. See supra text accompanying notes 42-48.
84. Id. at- 682 P.2d at 168 (citing Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452).
85. Id. at . .682 P.2d at 168.
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However, the controversy in Curran centered on navigability for use of the
Dearborn River, not for title, and navigability for use is a question of state,
not federal, law. 88
In determining the proper test for public use of waters in Montana, the
court noted other states either defined navigability to include recreational
uses or abandoned the concept of navigability in favor of an inquiry into
whether a waterway is susceptible to public use.87 Turning to Montana law,
the court held, based on article IX, section 3(3) of the Montana Constitu-
tion quoted above,88 that "Curran has no right to control the use of the
surface waters of the Dearborn to the exclusion of the public except to the
extent of his prior appropriation of part of the water for irrigation purposes,
which is not at issue here."8 The court also stated that Curran had no
rights of ownership to the riverbed because title to the riverbed, burdened
by the public trust, was transferred upon statehood to the state.90 In sum,
the court held the following:
The Constitution and the public trust doctrine do not permit a
private party to interfere with the public's right to recreational
use of the surface of the State's waters.. . . [U] nder the public
trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface
waters that are capable of recreational use may be so used by the
public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for
nonrecreational purposes."'
While the court recognized that Montana law grants private owner-
ship of the adjacent lands to the low-water mark,92 the "angling statute"9' 3
86. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 168, 170.
87. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 169-70.
88. See supra text accompanying note 76.
89. Curran, -. Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 170.
90. Id. However, this statement by the court addressing riverbed ownership is questionable for
several reasons. First, the public trust burdening the waters and underlying lands upon statehood in
1889 probably did not include the broad uses allowed by the 1972 Montana Constitution. See infra
notes 180-93 and accompanying text. Second, Montana law for state purposes grants the adjacent
landowner the strip of land between the high and low water marks on waters deemed navigable under
the federal test. See Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 39 P. 517 (1895); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201
(1987) (enacted 1885) (granting the adjacent landowner of nonnavigable waters the bed to the middle
of the stream). Third, this statement is inconsistent with the court's holding in Curran that as to use of
the waters "[s]treambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant." Curran. -Mont. at -. , 682
P.2d at 170. See also infra note 126.
91. Curran, -_Mont. at - , 682 P.2d at 170-71. Consequently, in Curran the Montana
Supreme Court declared irrelevant Herrinv. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587,241 P. 328 (1925). In Herrin,
the court declared that anyone wading up a nonnavigable stream was a trespasser. The court stated
Herrin was irrelevant for at least three reasons: (i) the creek involved in Herrin was nonnavigable
whereas the Dearborn River was navigable; (2) the Herrin holding is dicta; and (3) Herrin is contrary
to the 1972 Montana Constitution and the public trust doctrine. Curran, .Mont. at -, 682 P.2d
at 170-71.
92. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201.
93. Id. § 87-2-305. For further discussion on the angling statute see infra notes 185-88 and
POTENTIAL CONFLICT
gives the public the right to fish within the high-water marks.9 The court
noted that in Gibson it previously recognized a public right to fishing and
navigation up to the high-water mark.95 Thus, the court established the
boundary of the public's right to use state owned waters to the high-water
mark along with the right to portage unintrusively around barriers that
prevent passage within the high-water marks."
Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Hildreth involved the
Beaverhead River under facts similar to those in Curran. The court in
Hildreth reaffirmed the holdings of Curran. In stating that adjacent
landowners have no right to control the use of state owned waters, the court
stressed that the 1972 Constitution and the Curran holding demand any
waters capable of recreational use may be so used without regard to
streambed ownership or the federal navigability test.98 Since the 1972
Constitution does not limit the use of waters, the only possible limitation on
use can be the characteristics of the waters themselves.99 The court made
clear that the 1972 Constitution requires the capability of use test to
determine which waters may be recreationally used by the public. 00 While
the court in Curran only referred to the use of water up to the high-water
mark, the court in Hildreth expressly declared that the public has a right to
use not only the waters but also the beds and banks up to the high-water
mark.' 0' As in Curran, the court in Hildreth stated the public could
portage around barriers.0 2
The Curran and Hildreth decisions came at a time when an interim
Montana legislative subcommittee was studying recreational stream
access to recommend legislation to the 1985 legislature. 03 The interim
committee recommended two bills. Those two bills, along with nine others,
were introduced in response to Curran and Hildreth.°4 After much
debate, the 1985 legislature passed the stream access bill in an effort to
settle the stream access controversy.10 5
accompanying text.
94. Curran, -_Mont. at - 682 P.2d at 172.
95. Id.
96. Id. Interestingly, both the statute and case cited by the Montana Supreme Court to extend
the public's right to the high-water mark historically addressed navigable waters only as defined by the
federal test.
97. -Mont. at - , 684 P.2d at 1090-91.
98. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1091-92, 1094.
99. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1091.
100. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1091, 1094.
101. Id. at , 684 P.2d at 1091.
102. Id.
103. See Forging, supra note 2, at 25-37.
104. Id. at 34.
105. Id. at 34-37.
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The stream access statute108 actually addresses the recreational use of
streams more than it does access to streams.107 The statute provides that
subject to certain limitations, "all surface waters'0 8 that are capable of
recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to the
ownership of the land underlying the waters."' 0 9 The statute also allows the
public to portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner." 0
The stream access statute separates Montana streams into two classes
and delineates the specific uses allowed in each class. Class I streams are all
those streams deemed navigable under the federal navigability test."'
Uses originally permitted on Class I waters included big game hunting
with a long bow or shotgun, camping out of sight or further than 500 yards
from an occupied dwelling, and the placement of duck blinds, boat docks
and other permanent objects out of sight or further than 500 yards from an
occupied dwelling."' The statute defines Class II waters as all those
streams that are not Class I waters," 3 which basically means streams
nonnavigable under the federal test. On Class II waters only water related
pleasure activities are permitted, not including big game hunting, over-
night camping or the placement of any seasonal object." 4 Although the
statute permits broad public recreational use of streams, the Montana Fish
and Game Commission may limit, restrict or prohibit completely the
recreational use of a stream in the interest of public health, public safety or
the protection of public and private property." 5
In Galt v. State,"6 the stream access statute was challenged as an
unconstitutional taking of private property without just compensation.
Galt, a landowner, requested that the district court declare certain
106. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to -322 (1987).
107. The bill does provide that the public's right of use does not give the public the right of access
across private land to get to the public water. Id. § 23-2-302(4).
108. The statute also includes beds and banks up to the ordinary high-water mark. Id. § 23-2-
301(12)
109. Id. § 23-2-302(1).
110. Id. § 23-2-311(1).
III. Id. § 23-2-301(2). Judicial decision has declared the Missouri, Gallatin, Flathead,
Yellowstone, Big Horn and the Dearborn Rivers navigable. See Comment, Recreational Use of
Montana's Waterways: An Analysis of Public Rights, 3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 133, 153 (1982); Curran,
-Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 166. Other waters are included in Class I waters because they are
officially meandered in a federal government survey or are capable of meeting the federal navigability
test. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(2). Navigable waters are defined by MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-
112 to include those waters meandered and returned as navigable in a federal survey, however, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 23-2-301(2) contains no such "returned as navigable" provision for inclusion in Class I
waters.
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(2)(d), (e) & (f).
113. Id. § 23-2-301(3).
114. Id. § 23-2-302(3).
115. Id. § 23-2-302(5).
116. -Mont_ 731 P.2d 912 (1987).
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provisions of the statute an unconstitutional taking.11 The district court
117. Id. at - , 731 P.2d at 913. Gait challenged the following sections:
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-301. Definitions. For purposes of this part, the following
definitions apply:...
(2) "Class I waters" means surface waters, other than lakes that:
(a) lie within the officially recorded federal government survey meander lines thereof;
(b) flow over lands that have been judicially determined to be owned by the state by reason of
application of the federal navigability test for state streambed ownership;
(c) are or have been capable of supporting the following commercial activities: log floating,
transportation of furs and skins, shipping, commercial guiding using multiperson water-
craft, public transportation, or the transportation of merchandise, as these activities have
been defined by published judicial opinion as of April 19, 1985; or
(d) are or have been capable of supporting commercial activity within the meaning of the
federal navigability test for state streambed ownership.
(3) "Class II waters" means all surface waters that are not class I waters, except lakes..
(12) "Surface water" means, for the purpose of determining the public's access for
recreational use, a natural water body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary high-water
mark.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302. Recreational use permitted-limitations--exceptions.
(I) Except as provided in subsections (2) through (5), all surface waters that are capable of
recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to the ownership of the land
underlying the waters.
(2) The right of the public to make recreational use of surface waters does not include,
without permission or contractual arrangement with the landowner:
(a) the operation of all-terrain vehicles or other motorized vehicles not primarily designed
for operation upon the water;
(b) the recreational use of surface waters in a stock pond or other private impoundment fed
by an intermittently flowing natural watercourse;
(c) the recreational use of waters while diverted away from a natural water body for
beneficial use pursuant to Title 85, chapter 2, part 2 or 3, except for impoundments or
diverted waters to which the owner has provided public access;
(d) big game hunting except by long bow or shotgun when specifically authorized by the
commission;
(e) overnight camping within sight of any occupied dwelling or within 500 yards of any
occupied dwelling, whichever is less;
(f) the placement or creation of any permanent duck blind, boat moorage, or any seasonal or
other objects within sight of or within 500 yards of an occupied dwelling, whichever is less; or
(g) use of a streambed as a right-of-way for any purpose when water is not flowing therein.
(3) The right of the public to make recreational use of class II waters does not include,
without the permission of the landowner:
(a) big game hunting;
(b) overnight camping;
(c) the placement or creation of any seasonal object; or
(d) other activities which are not primarily water-related pleasure activities as defined in 23-
2-301(10). ...
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-311. Right to Portage-establishment of portage route.
(1) A member of the public making recreational use of surface waters may, above the
ordinary high-water mark, portage around barriers in the least intrusive manner possible,
avoiding damage to the landowner's land and violation of his rights. . .
(3)(e) The cost of establishing the portage route around artificial barriers must be borne by
the involved landowner, except for the construction of notification signs of such route, which
is the responsibility of the department. The cost of establishing a portage route around
artificial barriers not owned by the landowner on whose land the portage route will be placed
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upheld the constitutionality of the provisions and awarded summary
judgment for the state.118 The Montana Supreme Court reversed and held
some of the provisions unconstitutional," ' 9 and further expounded upon the
public trust doctrine in Montana.
At issue in Galt were certain uses of the beds and banks of streams,
namely, the public's right pursuant to the stream access statute to build
permanent structures, camp overnight, hunt big game and portage around
artificial barriers at the landowners' expense. 20 The Montana Supreme
Court framed the issues as follows: (1) "[w] hether the public trust doctrine
relating to water includes the use of adjoining land?''2 and (2) whether
the stream access statute permits "uses of the bed and banks and adjoining
land beyond the scope of the public trust doctrine?"'22
The court began by declaring that the "public trust doctrine is found
at Article IX, Section 3(3), of the Montana Constitution .. .."I" This
constitutional provision makes no distinction among waters; "Jaill waters
are owned by the State for the use of its people.' 124 Reiterating the holding
in Curran, the court reaffirmed that the recreational capability of waters
determines their availability for public recreational use regardless of
streambed ownership. 25 The court stated that even though the adjoining
landowners hold fee title to the land, the public's right included use of the
beds and banks up to the high-water mark.'26
However, the court stated that the "public trust doctrine in Montana's
must be borne by the department ...
118. Gait, -. Mont. at -, 731 P.2d at 913.
119. Id. at -, 731 P.2d at 913, 916. See infra note 133.
120. Gait, -Mont. at - , 731 P.2d at 915-16.
121. Id. at ,731 P.2d at 913.
122. Id.
123. Id. at -, 731 P.2d at 914.
124. Id. at -, 731 P.2d at 915 (emphasis in the original).
125. Id.
126. Id. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-201 provides:
Owner of land bounded by water. Except where the grant under which the land is held
indicates a different intent, the owner of the land, when it borders upon a navigable lake or
stream, takes to the edge of the lake or stream at low-water mark; when it borders upon any
other water, the owner takes to the middle of the lake or stream.
Presumably, on streams deemed navigable under the federal test, he strip of land between the low and
high-water marks is burdened by the public trust principles set out in Illinois Central. However, this
statute granting ownership to adjoining landowners to the low-water mark was enacted in 1895. In
1895, the public trust, which attached to the state by virtue of Illinois Central, included only protection
of navigation, commerce and fisheries. The 1895 statutory grant, therefore, was only burdened by these
uses. As a result, the court in Gait, in effect, held that adding additional trust purposes in 1985, such as
building permanent structures and permitting big game hunting, constituted an unconstitutional
taking by placing restrictions upon the land grant not originally burdening the grant. As the court in
Gait discussed, the public trust doctrine in the 1972 Constitution concerned both public ownership and
use of water, but not the use of the lands underlying the waters. Gait, -Mont. at _. 731 P.2d at
915.
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Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of
streams. 1 2 7 The use of the beds and banks up to the high-water mark
"must be of minimal impact" and "only such use as is necessary to
utilization of the water itself.1' 28 Therefore, overnight camping, big game
hunting and the building of permanent objects are not necessary to the
utilization of the water itself.129
Reaffirming "well established constitutional principles protecting
property interests from confiscation," the court found that "minimal
impact" by the public did not include the landowner paying for portage
routes around artificial barriers.130 The state must pay the expense since
the benefit of the portage flows only to the public even though the
landowner's fee interest is "impressed with a dominant estate in favor of
the public." 13' The court reasoned that such a holding was necessary to
resolve the competing interests of the public and the landowner, both of
which are constitutionally protected.13 2
Accordingly, the court held unconstitutional those provisions which
allowed uses not necessary to the public's utilization of water and which
required the landowner to pay for portage routes.133 The court's holding in
Gait further defined and limited the application of the public trust doctrine
in Montana. However, how other states have applied the doctrine in
resolving water resource conflicts is helpful in analyzing the future of the
public trust doctrine in Montana.
B. Other States
In United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Watbr
Conservation Commission,"" the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
the public trust doctrine limits water rights.1 3 5 The plaintiffs in that case
sought an injunction to prevent the state from issuing water permits for
coal related energy production until comprehensive plans for conservation
127. Gait, -Mont. at -, 731 P.2d at 915. In Curran, the court stated the public trust
doctrine and the 1972 Constitution demanded the broad recreational use of Montana waters. Curran,
-. Mont. at-, 682 P.2d at 171. In Hildreth the court used language similar to that in Curran, but
stated that the 1972 Constitution requires broad recreational uses because the constitutional provision
does not limit the waters' use. Hildreth, -_Mont. at - , 684 P.2d at 1091.
128. Gait, -_Mont. at - , 731 P.2d at 915.
129. Id. at . 731 P.2d at 915-16.
130. Id. at ,731 P.2d at 916.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Specifically, the court found MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-302(d), (e) and (f) and § 23-2-
31 l(3)(e) unconstitutional. See supra note 117.
134. 247 N.W. 2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
135. Id. at 460.
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and development had been completed.lse The plaintiffs claimed a North
Dakota statute and the public trust doctrine required the making of such
plans before issuing water permits. 3 7 The court ruled that the North
Dakota statute was not mandatory, but only an advisory policy state-
ment.1 8 However, the court stated the discretionary authority of the state
to allocate water was circumscribed by the public trust doctrine. 39
The court confined the public trust doctrine to traditional concepts
and held that before water could be allocated the doctrine "requires, at a
minimum, a determination of the potential effect of the allocation of water
on the present water supply and future water needs" of the state.4 0 The
court indicated that the doctrine only applied to navigable waters.' 4 ' The
court stated that until the North Dakota legislature spoke more forcefully,
all that was required under the public trust doctrine was evidence of some
appropriation planning.1 2 Whether the North Dakota Supreme Court was
merely using the public trust doctrine to help resolve competing appropria-
tions or using the doctrine as broad protection of the public's interest in
water against the appropriation doctrine is unclear. 43
The California Supreme Court made it shockingly clear that Califor-
nia would take the latter position. 44 In National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court of Alpine County, 45 more commonly known as the Mono
Lake decision, the California Supreme Court made the broadest declara-
tion of public trust principles yet. 48 In that case, the prior appropriation
and public trust doctrine clashed outright for the first time. 47
In Mono Lake, the City of Los Angeles had acquired appropriated
rights to four of the five tributary streams of Mono Lake. 48 Los Angeles'
diversions from the nonnavigable tributaries had seriously degraded Mono
Lake by 1979.' 49 The lake's surface area had decreased by one-third,
136. Id. at 459.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 460.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 462.
141. Id. at 461.
142. Id. at 463.
143. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1,17-34 to -35 (1984).
144. Id. at 17-2.
145. 33 Cal. 3d. 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
146. Forging, supra note 2, at 8.
147. Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: The Expanding Public Trust
Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617, 618 (1984).
148. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d. at 424, 658 P.2d at 711, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
149. Id. at 424-31, 659 P.2d at 711-16, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348-53.
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causing aesthetic and serious ecological damage.1 50 The National Audu-
bon Society sued for injunctive relief on the theory the lake was protected
by the public trust doctrine and Los Angeles' diversions violated the
public's rights in Mono Lake's navigable waters.1 51 The city claimed the
appropriated rights were legally acquired and protected under the Califor-
nia water rights system, thus precluding an application of the public trust
doctrine to those rights. 5 '
The California Supreme Court purportedly integrated the prior
appropriation and public trust doctrines rather than holding exclusively for
one. However, the court stated the public trust doctrine expands to protect
changing public needs, including scenic views and wildlife habitat preser-
vation. 5 ' The court also stated the doctrine protects against harmful
actions in nonnavigable tributaries that affect trust values in navigable
waters. 54 The court noted the state as trustee has a continuing duty to re-
evaluate water uses in light of changing public needs and is not confined by
past allocation decisions.' 55 The state has the power under the doctrine to
revoke previously granted water rights when those rights are harmful to the
trust because all rights acquired in trust property are taken subject to the
trust. 15 Therefore, the court suggested a revocation of rights would not be
a taking for which compensation was required. 57
The California Supreme Court determined that public trust rights
inhere in all waters deemed navigable under the federal test and in all
tributaries affecting navigable waters. The court ruled that to protect the
public trust rights the state has a continuing duty to reconsider consump-
tive water rights granted subject to the public trust. In effect, no vested
water rights can bar the state's reconsideration of those public rights. 5 8
The Mono Lake decision ordered no particular allocation of water. 59
The court did require the state to weigh the public interest in protecting
public trust values in Mono Lake against the public interest in continuing
diversions for Los Angeles' water needs before allocating water re-
sources. 1 0 The court claimed this result was necessary to integrate the
competing appropriation and public trust doctrines.'""
150. Id.
151. Id. at 425-33, 659 P.2d at 712-18, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 348-55.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 434-35, 452, 658 P.2d at 719, 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 356, 369.
154. Id. at 435-37, 658 P.2d at 720, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
155. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
156. Id. at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
157. Id. at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
158. Id. at 447-48, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
159. Id. at 452, 658 P.2d at 732, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Kootenai Environmental Alliance v.
Panhandle Yacht Club'62 stated emphatically that it would follow the
California approach. 6 In Kootenai Environmental Alliance, the Alliance
challenged a yacht club lease to part of Lake Coeur d'Alene as a violation
of the public trust doctrine. The Idaho Supreme Court found the lease did
not violate the public trust. However, the court stated that the state may
reconsider in the future the compatibility of the lease with the public trust
since the lease remained subject to the trust.164 Although Kootenai
Environmental Alliance did not involve appropriated water rights, the
Idaho Supreme Court declared in adopting the California rule that the
"public trust doctrine takes precedent . . . over vested water
rights . .. ."65
Colorado appears unlikely to follow the trend of expanding the scope
and influence of the public trust doctrine on its water law.1 66 The Colorado
Supreme Court in People v. Emmert'67 upheld a criminal conviction of
trespass for floating on a nonnavigable stream across a privately owned
ranch. The court held that the Colorado constitutional provision declaring
stream waters the property of the public simply establishes the right of
appropriation.' 68 The court stated that the provision did not extend a public
right to use recreationally all waters of Colorado and further stated that the
riparian landowner retained exclusive control of the waters bounded by the
lands of nonnavigable streams. 69
The Colorado Supreme Court recognized the various rationales used
by other states to allow recreational use, but did not follow the trend
separating bed title from public recreational use. 70 The court found the
common law rule allowing landowner control of the waters of "more force
and effect, especially given its long-standing recognition" in Colorado''
through legislative enactments limiting public access.1 2 Any change in the
rule was a legislative, not a judicial, function. 73 In Emmert, the Colorado
162. 105 Idaho 622, 671 P.2d 1085 (1983).
163. Id. at 631, 671 P.2d at 1094.
164. Id. at 631-33, 671 P.2d at 1095-96.
165. Id. at 631, 671 P.2d at 1094.
166. Dunning, supra note 143, at 17-38 to -39.
167. 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979).
168. Id. at 142,597 P.2d at 1028. COLO. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 5 reads: "The water of every natural
stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to appropriation as
hereinafter provided."
169. Emmert, 198 Colo. at 141-44, 597 P.2d at 1027-29.
170. Id. at 141, 597 P.2d at 1027.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 143-44, 597 P.2d at 1029-30.
173. Id. at 141,597 P.2d at 1027 (citing Smith v. People, 120 Colo. 39, 51, 206 P.2d 826, 832
(1949)).
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Supreme Court reaffirmed its adherence to traditional concepts of prior
appropriation law in the face of a challenge by the public trust doctrine.
Montana's application of the public trust doctrine currently falls
between the extremes of California's Mono Lake and Colorado's Emmert.
In Curran, Hildreth and Gait the court held that under Montana's
Constitution the public's right to use Montana's waters includes recreation
on any stream capable of recreational use. Although both the Montana and
Colorado Supreme Courts were faced with similar constitutional provi-
sions, Montana separated the public's right of recreational use from
ownership of the underlying beds and banks. Unlike the California
Supreme Court in Mono Lake, however, the Montana Supreme Court in
Gait grounded Montana's expression of public trust doctrine in the
constitution and in Curran suggested the public's right to use a stream
under the public trust doctrine is subject to the landowner's prior
appropriated water right.
Montana has yet to consider a direct challenge to the prior appropria-
tion doctrine by public trust principles. Such a challenge is considered in
the analysis below.
IV. ANALYSIS OF A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE AND THE PRIOR APPROPRIATION DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
WATER LAW
The 1972 Montana Constitution's expression of the public trust
doctrine extended the public use of waters to any waters capable of
recreational use. This extension expanded the protected uses to include
recreation as well as navigation, commerce and fisheries. The constitution
also extended this protection to waters other than waters deemed navigable
under the federal test. The success of a public trust doctrine challenge to a
prior appropriated water right depends upon the strength of the Montana
Supreme Court's interpretation of the public trust doctrine in Montana.
The court in Curran stated that Curran had no right to control waters
to the exclusion of the public except to the extent of his prior appropria-
tions.1"4 In Hildreth, the court stated the 1972 Constitution required the
expansive definition of public uses in state owned waters.17 5 The court
reiterated in Gait that Montana's expression of the public trust doctrine is
found in the 1972 Constitution. 17 6 If it were to take the most narrow view of
the public trust doctrine, the court could hold that Montana waters are
subject only to the traditional public trust principles. Therefore, the waters
174. Curran, -Mont. at -_ 682 P.2d at 170.
175. Hildreth, -Mont. at _ 684 P.2d at 1091.
176. Gait, -. Mont. at - , 731 P.2d at 914-15.
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are protected against an appropriation only when they are needed for the
public uses of commerce, navigation and fisheries on waters deemed
navigable under the federal test. A valid water right could not be
challenged on public trust doctrine principles unless the water right
threatened the traditional uses on navigable waters. This narrow interpre-
tation would dictate that a recreational use is subject to appropriated water
right uses.
The court should not adopt this narrow interpretation without further
analysis. The caveat on recreational use stated in Curran needs closer
examination for several reasons. The essence of finding that property is
held in trust, including a public trust, is that anyone who acquires interests
in trust property does so subject to the trust.177 Therefore, the court should
look beyond the federal trust principles to determine whether Montana
adopted its own principles before 1972 which either expanded the
traditional uses or extended the public trust doctrine to nonnavigable
waters. Both of these determinations must be answered in the negative
before the court can absolutely state that recreational use is subject to prior
appropriations before 1972.
The suggestion has also been made that the public trust doctrine is
extra-constitutional, protecting publicly important waters despite consti-
tutional and statutory provisions allowing their allocation. 78 One com-
mentator suggests the public trust doctrine is needed to prevent serious
environmental damage caused by the use of vested water rights in order to
avoid federal intervention over state control of water resources."7 9 Thus,
the court should address all of the above considerations before subjecting
recreational uses, allowed by Montana's expression of the public trust
doctrine, to all prior appropriations. As argued below, the court should
adopt the narrow interpretation despite these considerations for two
reasons: (1) the strength of the prior appropriation doctrine in Montana
water law, and (2) the lack of a pre-1972 expansion of the public trust
doctrine.
A. Pre-1972 Considerations
As mentioned above, the Montana Supreme Court in Gibson in 1895
recognized that the public had certain rights of navigation and fishery upon
navigable rivers.180 However, the issue of public rights in Gibson was not
central to the case and the court's analysis was couched in traditional
177. State v. Pettibone, -Mont.-, 702 P.2d 948, 956-57 (1985) (citing National
Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360).
178. Forging, supra note 2, at 10-12.
179. Dunning, supra note 143, at 17-44 to -45.
180. Gibson, 15 Mont. at 423, 39 P. at 519; see supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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public trust doctrine terms. Whether the court was considering general
rights of recreation upon navigable waters is doubtful.
In Herrin v. Sutherland,"'1 a 1925 Montana decision, the court held
that the defendant fisherman trespassed when he waded up a nonnavigable
stream flowing through private property.8 2 The court stated that the
public had no right to fish a nonnavigable body of water.18 3 While the court
in Curran held Herrin irrelevant,184 arguably, Herrin stands for the
proposition that until 1972 no public rights were protected or allowed by
the public trust doctrine upon nonnavigable waters.
In 1933, the Montana legislature enacted the "angling" statute which
authorized the public use of navigable waterways for recreational fish-
ing.18 5 Montana has not determined whether this statute is merely a
codification of the public rights allowed under the Illinois Central term
"fishery." At least one state, Idaho, interpreted its similar statute to
include not only fisheries, but all recreational uses.1 88 Likewise, Montana
in its 1933 angling statute may have extended the permitted public uses on
navigable waters to include recreational uses not traditionally contem-
plated under the term "fishery." The statute states that "any rights of title
to [navigable] streams or the land between the high water flow lines...
shall be subject to the right" of any licensed Montana angler to fish. 1817 If
the angling statute includes broad recreational rights, then the language of
the statute may work to burden prior appropriated water rights. Therefore,
the public trust doctrine would protect broad recreational uses if an
appropriated water right, acquired on a navigable stream after 1933,
would interfere with the recreational uses. 88 However, because the statute
limits its application to holders of fishing licenses, the statute is probably
181. 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 (1925).
182. Id. at 596, 241 P. at 331.
183. Id.
184. Curran, -Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 170-71. See also supra note 91.
185. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (1987) provides:
Navigable rivers, sloughs, or streams between the lines of ordinary high water thereof the
state of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through any public lands of the
state shall hereafter be public waters for the purpose of angling, and any rights of title to
such streams or the land between the high water flow lines or within the meander lines of
navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person owning an angler's license of
this state who desires to angle therein or along their banks to go upon the same for such
purpose.
186. Southern Idaho Fish and Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho 360, 362-63, 528
P.2d 1295, 1297 (1974).
187. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305 (emphasis added); see Gait, -Mont. at -. , 731 P.2d
at 922 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
188. However, the majority in Gait restricted recreational uses allowed on navigable rivers.
Gait, -Mont. at , 731 P.2d at 915-16. See supra text accompanying notes 116-33. This
suggests that the angling statute was not intended to protect broad recreational uses from interference
with the use of appropriated water rights.
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only a codification of the right to fish upon navigable waters and not a
creation of broad recreational use rights which take precedent over prior
appropriations.
In 1966 the Montana Supreme Court suggested that in Paradise
Rainbows, that public rights for fishing may be recognized given the proper
circumstances. 189 As discussed previously, the Commission in Paradise
Rainbows unsuccessfully claimed an appropriated water right for public
fishing despite an appropriator's entire diversion of the stream.190 The
court, in upholding the appropriator's water right, stated that
"[i] ndividuals who have put water to a beneficial use should not have their
rights arbitrarily diluted, under claim of sovereign rights or otherwise.' 191
Apparently, the court in Paradise Rainbows did not establish or address
any sort of public trust protection for fishing or recreation on waters
navigable or nonnavigable.'192
The above cases and angling statute do not acknowledge that an
appropriator's water right is burdened by any public uses other than
navigation, commerce and fishery. 9 ' Water rights appropriated before
1972, then, were only burdened by the public trust protections attaching
under Illinois Central to navigable waters. Nonnavigable waters were not
trust property before 1972. A recreational user could not claim that the
public trust doctrine prior to 1972 specifically protected the waters, and
therefore could not exercise a public recreational use right over an
appropriated right.
189. 148 Mont. at 419-20, 421 P.2d at 721. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
190. Paradise Rainbows, 148 Mont. at 418-20, 421 P.2d at 720-21.
191. Id. at 420, 421 P.2d at 721.
192. The creek involved in Paradise Rainbows appeared nonnavigable. 148 Mont. at 415-16,
420,421 P.2d at 718-19,721. To read Paradise Rainbows as an extension of public rights of fishing in
nonnavigable waters under the public trust doctrine would contradict the 1925 Herrin decision. See
supra text accompanying notes 181-84. And at least before the 1972 Constitution and Curran, which
held Herrin irrelevant, the precedent established by Herrin could not be ignored. See supra note 91.
193. While the angling statute may arguably extend public trust protection to recreational uses
on navigable rivers, an express declaration of the doctrine's extension to nonnavigable waters appears
needed before sufficiently burdening a water right on a nonnavigable waterway. Such a declaration is
needed because in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935),
the United States Supreme Court held that "following the [Desert Land Act] of 1877, if not before, all
non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary
control of the designated states. . . with the right in each to determine for itself to what extent the rule
of appropriation or the common-law rule in respect of riparian rights should obtain." Id. at 163-64. The
Court further held that the Act "simply recognizes and gives sanction, in so far as the United States and
its future grantees are concerned, to the state and local doctrine of appropriation, and seeks to remove
what otherwise might be an impediment to its full and successful operation." Id. at 164. The only
express Montana law applicable to nonnavigable waters are the laws and cases allowing the
appropriation of nonnavigable waters and Herrin, in which the court suggested that no public
recreational right existed on nonnavigable streams.
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A recreational user'94 would have to rely on a rationale similar to that
used by the California Supreme Court in Mono Lake to challenge an
appropriated right195 acquired before 1972. More specifically, a recrea-
tional user would claim that "the public trust imposes a duty of continuing
[state] supervision over the taking and use of the appropriated water...
[in the state's exercise of] . . . its sovereign power to allocate water
resources in the public interest . . ,.'. Key to the recreational user's
claim would be the assertion that the duty of continuing supervision allows
the state to reconsider and change past allocation decisions "which may be
incorrect in light of current knowledge or inconsistent with current
needs."' 97 The recreational user must argue that in light of current needs
the public interest demands water be kept in the stream instead of
withdrawn by an appropriator to fulfill a water right that was acquired
before 1972.
The Montana Supreme Court should reject the above claim for three
related reasons. First, the California rule applying a duty of continuing
supervision to grants of trust property was developed under that state's
judicial decisions. 98 While a state has the power to extend public trust
protection beyond the mandates of Illinois Central, this is a matter of state
law.' 99 As noted above, Montana, at least before 1972, apparently did not
extend a public trust duty of continuing supervision over waters other than
navigable waters for the purpose of navigation, commerce and fishery.
Second, even if the public trust language applies retroactively to
virtually all waters and includes considerations for recreational use, both
the 1889 and 1972 Constitutions declare an appropriated, beneficial use to
be a public use.200 Some courts have determined that legislative acts
194. While this comment focuses on the recreational user, any other person seeking public trust
protection of a use other than navigation, commerce or fishery against a pre-1972 appropriation may
also be able to apply the rationale used by the California Supreme Court in the Mono Lake decision.
195. The use of the term appropriated right assumes that the right is a legally acquired and used
water right with a beneficial purpose.
196. National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 447, 658 P.2d at 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 433-41, 658 P.2d at 718-24, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355-61.
199. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. The proposition that state law controls what
rights inhere in waters beyond the protection of navigation, commerce and fishery on navigable waters
is also supported by Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363
(1977). The Court in Corvallis addressed the ownership of land which became the bed of a navigable
river after Oregon's admission to the United States. The Court stated that state law governs
dispositions of land under navigable waters subject only to the rights of navigation on the waters. Id. at
372-78. While this case addressed ownership of land under navigable waters, the proposition can easily
be extended to navigable waters in other cases. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. MONT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3(2) further
provides: "The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be appropriated for sale, rent, distribution,
or other beneficial use . . . shall be held to be a public use."
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declaring a use of public trust property to be a public use are subject to
judicial review.20 1 However, the Montana Supreme Court has stated that
the constitutional provisions declaring appropriated uses to be public uses
have "the effect of foreclosing all inquiry into the question whether or not
the enumerated uses are public, both by the Legislature and the
judiciary."202
Further, the rationale used in Mono Lake would require the Montana
Supreme Court to weigh the interests between a recreational in-stream use
and an appropriated use. The court would then have to decide, based on the
current public interest, the allocation of water between these two public
uses. While other courts have taken such a balancing approach, 0 3 the
Montana Supreme Court is not in a position to decide which public use is
more appropriate. Since the 1972 Montana Constitution recognized and
confirmed all existing appropriated water rights,2 °0 the court would be
hard pressed to hold under a public trust doctrine theory that the water
needed for a recreational use of public trust property was more in the public
interest than the water needed for the constitutionally protected appropri-
ated use. In other words, the public through the 1972 Constitution
impliedly declared that an appropriated water right is in the public interest
and a valid use of trust property.20 5
Third, the California Supreme Court stated that under its develop-
ment of the public trust doctrine, the doctrine takes precedent over vested
water rights.206 The court also suggested that because the public trust
doctrine imposes the duty of continuing supervision, a reallocation of water
201. See, e.g., Opinions of the Justices, 383 Mass. 895,424 N.E. 2d 1092 (1981); People ex rel.
City of Salem v. McMackin, 53 111. 2d 347, 291 N.E. 2d 807 (1972); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land &
Improvement Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896), aff'g on rehearing, 103 Wis. 537, 79 N.W. 780
(1899).
202. General Agriculture Corp. v. Moore, 166 Mont. 510, 514-15, 534 P.2d 859, 862 (1975)
(citing State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 341, 30 P.2d 805, 808 (1934)).
203. See, e.g., National Audubon Socy', 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346
(1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983) (weighing appropriations of trust property against
environmental concerns); Cityof Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda, 26 Cal. 3d 515,606 P.2d 362,
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980) (filling of public trust property versus returning it
to its original state); Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 285 Or. 197,590 P.2d 709 (1979) (filling of
trust property for airport runway versus recreational use of the property); and Trempealeau Drainage
Dist.: Merwin v. Houghton, 146 Wis. 398, 131 N.W. 838 (1911) (weighing the alteration of trust
property against recreational use).
204. MONT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3(1).
205. The California Supreme Court rejected an argument by the California Attorney General
that all public uses of water are "trust uses." Consequently, an appropriation of water by a private
person is not considered a public use under the public trust doctrine. The court assumed "trust uses"
were only those relating to activities in the vicinity of the waters in issue. National Audubon Socy, 33
Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360. However, this assumption was based on
California state law on the public trust doctrine.
206. Id. at 447, 658 P.2d at 729, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
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from an appropriated use to meet current public interests would not be a
taking of property for which compensation was required.07
In Montana, however, a legally acquired and used appropriated water
right is a valuable property right constitutionally protected. 08 The
Montana Supreme Court stated in State v. Pettbone209 that the 1972
Montana constitutional provision recognizing and confirming existing
water rights "prevents the State from affecting rights vested at the time the
Constitution was adopted other than through the exercise of Constitution-
ally provided powers such as eminent domain . . . or the general police
power, and without affording due process of law. . ,,111 Therefore, the
court could not now declare that the public trust language found in the
1972 Constitution addressing the public's use of state waters gives the state
207. Id. at 440,658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360. At least one commentator suggested the
Mono Lake decision constituted a taking without just compensation under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution because the uses and waters protected, and the duties which the court in
Mono Lake stated were required by the public trust doctrine, were not enunciated as law until after the
water rights at issue were appropriated. Therefore, retroactive application to property rights which
were not previously burdened by such public trust considerations requires compensation under the
Fifth Amendment because holding a water right subject to the public trust, which includes the ability of
the state to revoke that right based on current public needs, renders that water right valueless.
Comment, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 PAC.
L.J. 1291 (1984). Note that this discussion addresses a taking of the water right itself. The California
Supreme Court recognized that a water right owner has a vested right to any improvements erected.
National Audubon Soc'y, 33 Cal. 3d at 440, 658 P.2d at 723, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 360. Also, the United
States Supreme Court in Illinois Central stated that a state must pay for any improvements a grantee
makes in reliance upon a grant of trust property. 146 U.S. at 455.
208. See General Agriculture Corp., 166 Mont. at 516-18, 534 P.2d at 863-64 (stating that the
priority as well as the amount of an appropriated right is a valuable property right). See also WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 83 which reads:
[lI]t is appropriate to note that each valid right to the use of water is a real property right,
under the protective aegis of federal and state constitutional guarantees which prohibit the
deprivation of private property without due process of law.
Whatever may be the effect of water doctrinal restraints on free transfers of water
rights in a given area, this fact stands out clearly: the Fifth Amendment was added to the
United States Constitution at the beginning of our national history, and the Fourteenth
Amendment was added in 1868; therefore, every subsequent statute, court decision, or
acquired right of appropriation carried with it this fundamental constitutional inhibition
regarding due process-an inhibition which applies to rights in land and other property as
well as in water.
U.S. CONsT. amend. V provides: "No person shall be. . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." The
just compensation requirement is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy RR Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,
235-41 (1897).
209. -Mont-, 702 P.2d 948 (1985).
210. Id. at-_, 702 P.2d at 957. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 17 provides: "Due process of law. No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." The constitution also
provides: "Eminent domain. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into the court for the owner.
.. ."Id.§29.
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or the court the power to protect the waters needed for recreational use to
the detriment of a vested appropriated water right without constituting a
taking and requiring just compensation.
To hold that the 1972 Constitution's public trust language retroac-
tively applies to burden vested appropriated water rights with a state duty
of continuing supervision in light of current public needs would render the
above language requiring due process useless and essentially make
appropriated water rights valueless. Such an interpretation would also
open up the argument that the 1972 Montana Constitution itself violates
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
by allowing the state to reallocate without compensation an appropriated
water right which was obtained without notice of expanded public trust
principles. 1 ' Whether the framers of the 1972 Montana Constitution
211. See Comment, supra note 207. Although beyond the scope of this comment, an argument
could be made that the 1972 Montana Constitution and the interpretation given it by the Montana
Supreme Court and legislature violate Fifth Amendment standards of the United States Constitution.
In Curran, the Montana Supreme Court rejected an inverse condemnation claim because under the
1972 Constitution "the question of title to the bed is irrelevant to determination of navigability for use,
and Curran has no claim to the waters." Curran, -Mont. at , 682 P.2d at 17 1. The court also
found the Dearborn River to be navigable under the federal test. Id. at -, 682 P.2d at 166. However,
in Hildreth the court found the federal navigability test inapplicable and declined to decide whether the
Beaverhead River was navigable for title purposes. Hildreth, -Mont. at -, 684 P.2d at 1092. In
Hildreth, the court also rejected an inverse condemnation claim. Id. at -, 684 P.2d at 1093. In Galt,
the court balanced the right to use streams, as established under the 1972 Constitution, with the impact
upon the beds and banks as constitutionally protected property. Galt, -. Mont. at -, 731 P.2d at
914-16. See also supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text. However, Gait may not go far enough
given the status of nonnavigable streams in Montana before the 1972 Constitution. See supra notes
180-93 and accompanying text.
Although the court could base its Curran decision in part on the fact that the Dearborn River was
indeed navigable under the federal test, thus giving Curran no right to control the stream, the court in
Hildreth indicated this was irrelevant. Navigability under the federal test may not be irrelevant when
considering whether the increased right to use nonnavigable streams under the 1972 Constitution
violates the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment may be violated if two difficulties in finding a
taking are overcome. First, property owners abutting a nonnavigable stream would have to show that
their pre- 1972 control over the use of nonnavigable streams was somehow a constitutionally protected
property right. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987), stated the following in striking as unconstitutional the Coastal
Commission's grant of a building permit upon the condition a public easement to the beach be provided
by the landowner:
We have repeatedly held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, "the right
to exclude [others is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property.'" . . . [W]e observed that where governmental
action results in "[a] permanent physical occupation" of the property, by the government
itself or by others ... "our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the
occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has
only minimal economic impact on the owner." . . . We think a "permanent physical
occupation" has occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent
and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that real property may continuously be traversed,
even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself permanently upon the
premises.
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intended the language allowing public use of state waters to have this effect
is doubtful when given the framers' intent to carry over the public policy
developed under the 1889 Constitution and their intent to protect water
rights acquired under that document. 1"'
In a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Robinson v. Ariyoshi,215 the
Hawaii Supreme Court had overruled over a century of appropriation
water law and declared the common law doctrine of riparian ownership the
law of Hawaii. Landowners challenged this decision as a threat to their
irrigation water rights. 15 The state asserted that the court's decision
declared that the water rights acquired before the decision had not
vested .21  The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that while a
state has the sovereign power to change its water law and create new
definitions of property rights, the "[n] ew law. . . cannot divest rights that
were vested before the court announced the new law.1 17 Thus, the state
could not divest the plaintiffs of their water rights without just compensa-
tion and the state had to bring condemnation proceedings before interfer-
ing with water rights vested before the change in the law. 1
In Montana, a recreational user would have to claim the public trust
doctrine protection existed at the time a water right was acquired, thus
preventing the right from vesting. As shown above, there is little indication
in Montana law that Montana, as a matter of its own state law, ever
Id. at 3145 (citations omitted). Arguably, in Montana the right to exclude others from even "minimally
impacting" the beds and banks of a nonnavigable stream before 1972 may be a property right.
The second difficulty that must be overcome so as to find a taking would be a showing that the
interference with the property right rises to the level of a "taking" and that just compensation has been
denied. See id. at 3156-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2386-89 (1987). For a detailed discussion of the
issues involved in a "taking" argument such as the one above, see Laitos & Westfall, Government
Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
212. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
213. 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986).
214. 753 F.2d at 1474.
215. Id. at 1469.
216. Id. at 1473.
217. Id. at 1474.
218. Id. at 1474-75. The United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, 106 S. Ct. 3269 (1986), to be decided in light of Williamson County Regional Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). In Williamson, the Court held that a
Fifth Amendment taking claim was premature if the property owner had not obtained a final
administrative decision regarding the effect of a government regulation on the property or utilized
available state procedures for obtaining just compensation. Id. at 185-97. In Robinson, the defendant
state officials had not yet tried to apply the Hawaii Supreme Court's change of water law to the
plaintiffs. Robinson, 753 F.2d at 147 1. Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals' discussion in Robinson of the taking issue is still applicable if a state took action
based upon new law to interfere with a water right legally acquired before the new law was announced.
For the proposition that Williamson merely concerned a ripeness question see First English, 107 S. Ct.
at 2384 n.6, 2389 n.10.
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
extended the public trust doctrine beyond the protection of navigable
waters for commerce, navigation and fishery. Therefore, a change in
Montana water law would result if Montana either by its 1972 constitu-
tional public trust language or by a judicially created public trust theory
claimed that the public trust doctrine allows a reallocation of appropriated
water rights without it being a taking and requiring just compensation. 19
Consequently, if the state, based on the public trust doctrine, ordered an
actual interference with a water right acquired before the change in law,
then the state would be required to pay just compensation under the
rationale of Robinson as a way of balancing the competing interests of the
public trust doctrine and the owner of an appropriated water right.220
B. Post-1972 Considerations
The next issue to consider is whether the public trust language found
in the 1972 Constitution would allow the court to subject appropriated
water rights, acquired under the 1972 Constitution, to recreational uses.
The express language of the 1972 Constitution indicates just the opposite
by stating that all waters of the state "are the property of the state for the
use of its people and subject to appropriation for beneficial uses as provided
by law. ' 221 This language, combined with the intent to carry over the water
policy of the 1889 Constitution, suggests that the use of a waterway by
recreational users are subject to water rights acquired under the 1972
Constitution. Therefore, a recreational user would have to resort to the
rationale applied in Mono Lake to make a public trust doctrine challenge
upon a post-1972 water right. As shown above, this analysis is not
supported by the current Montana Constitution or case law and, in essence,
would require the court to create a new legal theory in Montana which
would raise the taking issue outlined above. 22
The 1972 Constitution does require, however, the legislature to
protect the environment and provide adequate remedies to prevent damage
to natural resources.223 Regarding water, the Montana legislature in the
219. Except, of course, if the purpose of the reallocation was to protect commerce, navigation or
fisheries on waters deemed navigable under the federal test.
220. The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Gait supports this proposition. Even though the
decision in Gait addressed landowners' interests in the beds and banks of streams, the court
"reaffirm[ed] well established constitutional principles protecting property interests from confisca-
tion." Galt, -Mont. at-, 731 P.2d at 916. The court stated that "[t]he real property interests of
private landowners are important as are the public's property interest[s] in water. Both are
constitutionally protected." id.
221. MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3).
222. See supra notes 208-20 and accompanying text.
223. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (1972) provides:
Protection and improvement.
(I) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful
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1973 Water Use Act 224 provided several provisions protecting the public's
interest in the development and allocation of the state's water resources.
For example, the Water Use Act for the first time defines "beneficial
use"- required for a valid appropriation-to include specific uses for fish,
wildlife and recreation. 225 Applications for certain larger in-state appro-
priations and out-of-state appropriations must meet environmental and
public interest criteria by "clear and convincing" evidence before a permit
will be issued.226 Before changing the purpose or place of use of larger
appropriations, environmental and public interest criteria must be met by
substantial credible evidence. 227 Similarly, larger lease applications under
the state water leasing program require an environmental impact state-
ment and must meet similar criteria as the larger appropriation applica-
tions.228 Also, Montana allows both state and federal political subdivisions
and agencies to reserve waters for the protection of in-stream flows. 22 9
These provisions of the Water Use Act allow the state substantial
control in the planning and allocation of appropriations. As mentioned
above, the North Dakota Supreme Court in United Plainsmen held that
the public trust doctrine required some minimum appropriation planning
until the legislature spoke more forcefully.2 30 The Montana Supreme
Court has no need to turn to the public trust doctrine to accomplish this
planning because the Montana legislature has already addressed the issue
by statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The demands placed upon Montana's scarce water resources, particu-
larly in dry years, will undoubtedly force the Montana Supreme Court to
environment in Montana for present and future generations.
(2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty.
(3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the
environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to
prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.
224. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-101 to -807.
225. Id. § 85-2-102(2)(a).
226. Id. § 85-2-311(2) & (3). For example, appropriation applications for over 4,000 acre-feet
per year or over 5.5 cubic feet per second must meet the environmental and public interest criteria by
clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 85-2-311(2).
227. Id. § 85-2-402(2).
228. Id. § 85-2-141(6) & (7). Note that MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(4) requires that a
change in purpose or place of use of these larger lease diversions must meet the environmental and
public interest criteria by clear and convincing evidence and must also pass legislative approval.
229. Id. § 85-2-316. Note however that the date of a water reservation is determined by the date
the reservation is adopted and does not affect prior existing rights. Id. § 85-2-316(8). For a discussion of
the importance of such reservations, see Peterman, The Clark Fork Legacy, MONTANA OUTDOORS,
March/April 1985, at 27.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 134-43.
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consider a direct public trust challenge upon the appropriation doctrine.
While it has been suggested the prior appropriation doctrine is outmo-
ded, 23 1 the doctrine is firmly entrenched in Montana's Constitution and
statutes. Therefore, the court must carefully analyze any direct public
trust doctrine challenge upon the prior appropriation doctrine.
The court should distinguish between those public trust principles
which attach to the states under the Illinois Central rationale as a matter of
federal law and the public trust principles which may attach to water rights
as developed under state law.2" 2 The court should also distinguish between
public trust protection of public uses of water and protection of the water
needed for the public use.
Prior to 1972, the only public trust principles which attached to a
water right validly appropriated were those enunciated in Illinois Central
and which protected the water necessary to accomplish navigation,
commerce and fishery on waters deemed navigable under the federal
test.233 In Galt, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana's
expression of the public trust doctrine was found in the 1972 Constitu-
tion. 2" The constitutional provision by its express language only protects
the public's use of waters on waters capable of recreational use. The court
correctly stated in Curran that the public's use of the water was subject to
the prior appropriation of water for irrigation.3 5 Under Montana's current
expression of the public trust doctrine no ground exists for the court to
effect a reallocation of a vested water right in favor of a broad recreational
use without requiring just compensation.
Adoption of the Mono Lake rationale in Montana would violate
federal and state constitutional provisions if it actually reallocated,
231. Wilkinson, supra note 7, at 344.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67. Courts and commentators in general have not
clearly made this distinction. A state may define navigability in an expansive way or eliminate any
navigability requirement to expand the uses protected or the waters protected. However, just because a
state expands its definition of navigability or eliminates the requirement does not mean that the federal
principles of the public trust doctrine (which protect an amount of water needed for commerce,
navigation, and fishery on waters navigable under the federal test) necessarily attach to the expanded
uses or waters. This jump in logic is made by a particular state under its legal processes. Therefore, in a
state such as Montana where no expanded definitions of the public trust existed before the 1972
Constitution, the concept of navigability as defined under the federal test is still important to determine
for which uses and on which waters an actual reallocation can be accomplished without a taking of a
vested water right requiring compensation.
233. Thus, for these principles the question of title to a streambed is still relevant to determine
which uses and which waters needed for those uses were protected under the public trust doctrine before
1972. In Curran the court referred to the question of title as irrelevant to navigability for use. Curran,
-Mont. at -, 682 P.2d at 170. That the 1972 Constitution demands this result for use and not
necessarily for protection of an amount of water should be kept clear.
234. Gait, -Mont. at -, 731 P.2d at 914.
235. Curran, -Mont. at - , 682 P.2d at 170.
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without compensation, an amount of water from a vested water right in
favor of a broad recreational use. The court "should not resort to creating
or finding legal theories when a result can be reached from express
constitutional language."2 6 As shown in the above analysis, the law as it
now exists under constitutional principles dictates the outcome of a
recreational user's public trust challenge to an appropriated water right.
The Montana Supreme Court in Galt correctly grounded the public
trust doctrine in constitutional terms. To say the public trust doctrine is
extra-constitutional or to say the public trust doctrine necessitates, without
compensation, a change in property rights according to current public
interest is not enough. "The supremacy of constitutional mandates is too
well established" to ignore.2 37
The conflict between the interests desired to be protected under the
public trust doctrine and those protected by the prior appropriation
doctrine can be reduced to the question of who pays for changing public
interests. The legislature through the 1973 Water Use Act provided for
ways within the prior appropriation doctrine to protect changing public
interests in the future allocations of water and in changes of present
allocations of water.2"8 The state should also consider new legislation to
fund protection of environmental and public interests from the damage or
conflict vested appropriated uses may pose.239 Such legislation would work
a practical balance within the appropriation doctrine between protected
property rights and desired public goals.
The people of the state of Montana reaffirmed their adherence to the
appropriation doctrine in the 1972 Constitution and the values that
doctrine protects in allowing the valid appropriations of water for public
uses such as irrigation.2"" The 1972 Constitution also placed upon the
legislature a broad duty to protect and preserve the environment and
236. Gait, -Mont. at - , 731 P.2d at 916 (Turnage, C. J., concurring).
237. General Agricultural Corp., 166 Mont. at 5 15-16, 534 P.2d at 862-63. The court further
stated:
A written constitution is not only the direct and basic expression of the sovereign will, it
is also the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and offices of government
with respect to all matters covered by it, and must control as it is written until it is changed by
the authority which established it. No function of government can be discharged in
disregard ofor in opposition to the fundamental law. The state constitution is the mandate of
a sovereign people to its servants and representatives. No one of them has a right to ignore or
disregard its mandates, and the legislature, the executive officers, and the judiciary cannot
lawfully act beyond its limitations.
Id. at 517-18, 534 P.2d at 862-63 (quoting 16 AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 56).
238. See supra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
239. For example, the state should consider specific legislation giving authority to create a pool
of funds which could be used by the state to lease rights from an appropriator on a "stand-by" basis in
times of critical need to protect stream flows and prevent environmental degradation.
240. MONT. CONsT. art. IX, § 3 (1972).
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natural resources in the public interest.24' These provisions require a
balance of societal and cultural values reflecting a range of public interests
from agricultural to environmental protection. Determining the exact
balance and what is in the public interest is a decision best left to the
legislature unless the court has clear principles to apply.
241. Id. art. IX, § 1.
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